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HOB, NOB, BOB, COB and SITUATION SEMANTICS 
Raymond Turner 
Geach describes the problem of intentional identity by reference to the 
following sentence: 
Hob thinks that a witch has blighted 
(1) Bob's mare and Nob believes that she 
(the same witch) killed Cob's sow. 
We are to imagine that a reporter is describing an outbreak of witch mania in 
Gotham village. Hob has been overcome by this mania, indeed, it was in his 
mind that the mania first started. It was he who started to speak about 
witches snd it was he who infected Nob with this religion. he has convinced 
Nob of the existence of some particular (from the perspective of their 
thoughts and beliefs) witch. Our reporter, on the' other hand, does not 
believe in the existence of witches (poor fool) nor indeed that there is any 
~~~icttialindividual at the focus of this mania~ Apparently then, Hob and Nob 
hsve attitudes which have a common focus even though there may not actually 
be anything at that focus. This is the kernel of the problem of intentional 
identity. 
Whst is the "logical form" of this sentence1 Suppose we permit ourselves the 
apparatus of first-order logic together with the intensional operators TH 
(Hob thinks that> and BN (l!.!!!t believ" !!!At) can we capture the intended 
reading of (1)1 
Our first stab at formalizing the intended reading might be the following: 
(2) TH(1Ix)(x is a witch & x has blighted Bob's mare) 
& 
BN(lIy)(y is a witch & y killed Cob's sow) 
This interpretation has the merit that the two attitudes are not directed at 
any ~ individual. On the other hand, it fails to capture the intended 
reading since there is no guarantee that Hob and Nob have attitudes towards a 
common focus. 
We can certainly obtain such a common focus with the following reading: 
(3) (:iIx)(TH(X is a witch & x has blighted Bob's mare) 
& 
BN(x is a witch & x killed Cob'. sow) 
) . 
113 
1
Turner: Hob, Nob, Bob, Cob and Situation Semantics
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1983
But this will not suffice. Reading (3) implies that there is some actual 
individual at the focus of their belief. Such an implication is not part of 
the intended reading. 
So we might try to retain the best of (2) and (3) as follows: 
(4) TB(:i!x)(X is a witch & x has blighted Bob's mare) 
BN(x is a witch & x killed Cob's sow) 
) . 
Although the focus of the two attitudes is the same, and this reading does 
not imply the existence of some actual individual at the focus, this is still 
inadequate. According to (4), the belief of Nob is part of the thoughts of 
Bob, and this is certainly not implied by (1) on the intended reading. 
As a final grope we might try to analyze the pronoun ~ in (1) as a 
substitute for a definite description. In which case the intended reading 
must be 
(5) TB(3X)(X is a witch & x has blighted Bob's mare) 
& 
~(1X)(X blighted Bob's mare) killed Cob's sow) 
or 
(6) TB(3x)(x is a witch & x has blighted Bob's mare) 
& 
(3y)(y • (1X)(X has blighted Bob'. mare) & 
~(y killed Cob's sow) 
) 
- according to whether the definite description is to have narrow or wide 
scope. These csn be easily dismissed. The reading (5) entails that Nob hss 
access to Bob's beliefs. As Geach points out our reporter might be justified 
in asserting (0, if he heard Bob say, "The witch has blighted Bob's mare" 
and later heard Nob say, "She killed Cob's sow," even if Bob had not thought 
or said anything about Cob's sow nor Nob about Bob's mare. Of course, our 
reporter would somehow have to know that Bob and Nob have been overcome by 
witch mania and that their thoughts had settled on a particular (from the 
perspective of their thoughts and beliefs) witch. The wide scope reading (6) 
will not work either: it commits the reporter to the existence of some 
particular and actual witch. 
We seem to have reached an impasse. It seems that the techniques of 
traditional philosophical logic cannot capture the intended reading of (1). 
To emphasize that the problem of intentional identity is not limited to 
Geach's sentence, we list some examples taken from [121. 
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Ernie believes thst he will find s proof for the theorem. He is sure it 
will not be an elegant one. 
that Larry kissed some girl last night. Ed is certain that 
she was good looking. 
Joan believes that someone stole ber car. She also believes he tried to 
break into her house. 
Bill believes tbat the lady on the stairs knows him. but John knows she 
is only a wax figure. 
In the next section we turn to an approach to the semantics of natural 
language which we believe throws new light on the problem of intentional 
SITUATION SEMANTICS 
In this section we provide a basic introduction to situation semantics. This 
d'ficU8llion will' be very brief'. For 'more' philosophical and linguistic 
motivation we refer the reader to the writings (both published and 
unpublished) of Barwise and Perry. These papers contain a more detailed 
account of all issues mentioned here. Our interest is in the problem of 
'intentional identity and. in the main. we sball discuss only those aspects of 
situation semantics which relate directly to this problem. 
The basic assumption or claim of situation semantics can be put quite simply: 
simple declarative sentences describe situations (or. more generally. courses 
: of events) whereas more complex sentences indicate properties of or relations 
, between situations. According to the perspective adopted in situation 
semantics, the world consists not just of objects but of objects having 
properties and standing in relation one to another. These "parts" of the 
world are called situations. 
2.1 Primitives of !hi. Ilwn:I. In attempting to develop a theory of linguistic 
meaning that concentrates on situations. Barwise and Perry recognize (as they 
say) the epistemological primacy of situations. but follow the lead of 
language and take objects. relations and locations as the primitives of their 
'theory. Situations and courses of events are constructed from them. The 
primitives of the theory are: 
'(a) a set A of objects or individuals aI' a2' a3 •••• 
(b) a set R • RO U Rl U R2 ... of relations where Ru is the set of 
n-ary relations 
(c) a set L of (space-time) locations 11' 12' 13 •••• 
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"Situations" are conatructed from these basic objecta as follows: a Situation 
s ia a pair <l.t> where I " Land t is a Situati9QlDa. where the setT. of 
aituation types. is the set of ntlhl functions n>O ~ x An + {O.I}. 80 the. 
set of .ituationa is the .et S - TxL. SituatiOns are special cases of 
courles of eventl where a ~ .!!i hm!!. (coe) e is a ltlI:till function from 
L into T - e " ! - L + T. We shall write eO) 811 el. The ~ coune of 
events e* ia the one that obtains. A lituation I - <l.t> is .IS1!!ll if t =. 
e*(1). PropolitioDi are set of coes. p. which are pertinent: 'if e " P aild 
e .=. e' then e' "P. 
2.2 ~ Lapguage l!I 1n order to give a semantic analY8is for Geach's 
troublesome sentence we need to provide the syntax and lemantics for the 
following constructions: 
w 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
Sentences and sentence conjunction (S) 
!foun phrans (NP) 
Property phrases (pp) 
Pronoun I 
Attitude verbs 
We .hall do this in the rest of .ection 2. We shall provide the Iyntax and 
semantica for an artificial language or fragment SIT rich enough to express 
the Geach lentence. We begin with a simple language and gradually enrich it 
until it includes all of the above feature •• 
.hili. Sywbolt 
Fir.tly. we introduce the basic Iymbola and their interpretation: 
1. The n-ary relation symbola are r. a •••• 
2. The terma are 
(a) a gap - } 
(b) thing variables X - {xl' x2 •••• } thing terma 
(c) namn!f - {nl' n2 •••• } 
(d) location variabln U - {ulm u2' ••• vI' v2}. 
3. Logical operators A.V. 
To interpret the basic aymbola we need to specify an interpretation function 
I which ssaigns elements of A to names and elements of Rn to n-ary relation 
symbola. We aho require an element c of c - Xu U + Au L the set of 
conpectiont. Thue connections are partial functions such that c(xi) " A and 
c(ui) "L. Such a connection represents the links between certain words and 
thing I in the world. 
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We first live the main rule for .entences. 
(i) If a i. an NP and ~ i. a PP (property phra.e> then [~l i. an S. 
(i0 c[[a~ne <-> there i. an • £ A luch that cfiaUe.a and c[,ae.a. 
What doe. thi. tell u.t The above .emantic rule i. to be read: (with 
connectiona c) [~J dllcribll e. iff (with connectione c) ~ characterbll a 
(given e) and a de.igpate. a (given e). 
S-rule involves .entence conjunction and disjunction. 
If '1 and 112 are in S then [til II 1121 are in S. 
eII'l II '2:&e <-> (ac' 2 c)(c'[flle and c'III1~Je). 
elIlii v '2& <-> (ac' 2. c)(c'[fl Je or c'll'2Je). 
comment upon (SB) later. Botice that the semantic type of sentence 
The .emantic type of BP'. i. CxExA: given a coe (and connection.) an BP 
de.ignate. an element of A. 
(i) If a i. a name. then a i. an NP. 
(i0 cIIale.a <-> a - I(a) 
(0 If x i. a thing variable. then x i. an BP. 
(ii) cllde.a <-> a - c(x) 
The.e rule. sre .traightforvard '0 ve offer no comment. 
PP-aulll 
In order to .pecify the structure of PP's we need to delcribe several .ub-
categorie.. Ba.ical1y PP'. are "located" relation •• 
(0 If r i. an n-ary basic relation .ymbol. then r and-r 
are n-ary relation phrases. 
(i0 cllrlle.l .... <-> el(I(r) .... ) - I 
cII-rlle.I .... <-> el(I(r) .... ) - 0 where .I. - <l1 ••••• An> £ An. 
The.e relations have type CxExLxAn: they characterize individuals at 
specified location. (given connection. and coes). 
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(i) If y is an n-ary RP and u a location variable then Yu 
is an n-ary LRP. 
(U) c~Yu]e • .!. <a> c~Y]e.c(u) • .!. 
These expressions have semantic type CxExAn • We can now give our main PP-
rules. 
(PPA) 
(H) 
(PPB) 
If Y is an n-ary LRP and tl ••••• t n are thing terms~ 
with gap tj. then (tl Y t2 ••• tn) is a PP (iff ti is a 
variable it is free in the resulting pp). 
c~tl Y t2 ••• tnJe,a <a> c[y]e • .!. where aj .. a 
and for i '" j c KtiJe,ai' 
If ~l and ~2 arePP's then nl A ~2 is a PP. 
d1TI A~2]e,a <a> (lIc' .::. c)(c'~1TI)e,a and c'[~2]e,a) 
Rule (PPA) informs us that pp's characterize individuals -- the individual 
that "fits in the gap". 
2.3 Antecedents To allow NP's to serve as antecedents, they are subscripted. 
The resulting NP's only designat objects when the connections ensure thst the 
NP's and governed variables designate the same object. We add a new NP-rule: 
(NPC) If CL is an NP .. (CLi ) is an NP; (CLi ) is the antecedent of xi' ~(CLi)De,a <a> c~CL]e,a and if c(xi) is defined c(xi) = a. 
By way of example consider the following sentence: 
(7) John has blighted Rosey and he has killed Lucy. 
This would be represented in SIT by the expression 
The NP's are (Johnl) and xl; the PP's are (- has blightedu Rosey) and (- killedv Lucy). Rule NPC guarantees that John and xl will designate the 
same object. We urge the reader to work out the details for herself. 
The rule NPC gives us a new way of "quantifying in": 
(pPC) If (CLi) is an NP and ~ a PP, with xi free, then 
(CL.~) is a PP (with xi not free). clItCLi~)]e,a <a> there is a bE A such that clI(CLi)]e,b 
and c'II~]e,a where c' '"' c+<xi,b> and c+<xi,b> = c U (xi,b> 
if the latter is a function; otherwise c+(xi,b> is undefined. 
We shall use this rule in obtaining one of the readings of the Geach 
sentence. 
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2.4 Singular Determiners We now extend our language by the addition of the 
singular determiners A and~. We introduce a new NP-rule: 
(NPD) (i) 
(ii) 
If -0 is a singular determiner and 71 a PP then (-071) is an NP. 
c[(a71)De.a <a> a is some x such that c[71Je.x 
C[(~71)Da.e <a> a is the unique x such that c[71De.x. 
Consider the sentence: 
(8) The witch was blighting and Hob disturbed her. 
This ia represented in SIT as 
[«The witch)l)(- was blightingu)] A [Hob(- disturbedVXI)] 
We want what Barwise and Perry call the attributive reading; for this reading 
we want different witches in different coes. This is the reason for the form 
of (SB)l and (PPB). Without the condition (:;Ic' :::. c)( ..... ). the pronoun !lll 
"7> (or more precisely the thing variable xl) would fix what the .I.1lI. witch 
~4designates -- it would designate the same thing in all coes. 
Sections 2.2. 2.3 and 2.4 are based on ALIAS [7]. 
2.5 Discourse Situation!! A discourse situation repre!!ents the situation in 
which the !!peaker and addressee find themselves. Suppose !!ome witch says 
(9) I blighted Bob's mare. 
This event occurs in the world. It involves the utterance of a certain token 
of a certain expression by a person. etc. This event is the discourse 
situation. 
A discourse situation is any situation d • <ld' td> with 
(i) A designated individual ad such that td(~' ad) - I 
(ii) location of utterance ld' 
Discourse situations are involved in the interpretation of expressions 
(indexicals) such as ~. ~. ~. ~. yesterday, tomorrow. 
We introduce a new NP-rule for indexicals. 
(NPE) (i) 
(ii) 
If ex = I then. ex is an NP 
c,d[I]e,a <a> a is the unique x such that td(speaks.x) - 1. 
Notice that NP's (and pp's) now have type CxDxExA where D(:='S) is the set of 
gi.course .ituations. The type of sentences is now CxDxE. 
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The analysis of indexicals and discourse situations is more fully discussed 
in [5] and [8]. 
2.6 Resource Situations Consider the sentence 
(10) A witchg has blightedv Bob's mare. 
Suppose that Hob has been telling us about some state of affairs; building" up 
a coe. Hob is bewildered by witch mania and has mentioned several wi~ches by 
name -- Janet, June , Janice, and Joyce. If Hob uttered (10) under such 
circumstances we would normally interpret his utterance as: 
{e: (~a)(I(Janet) - a or I(June) • a or I(Janice) a a or I(Joyce) = a 
and c,d[- has blightedv Bob's marele,a)} 
On the other hand, suppose that Hob has made no mention of witches or 
witchcraft. We now cannot "load" the description .!. witch. III this case we 
would naturally analyze (10) as: 
{e: (~a)(c,d[witchg]e,a and c,d[(- has blightedv Bob's mare)1e,a)} 
In the former case the background discussion contributes Janet, June, Janice 
and Joyce to the coe. 
How can we capture these differences f!lrmally7 Barwise and Perry introduce 
the so-called RESO U RCE coe; this can be exploited to load NP's snd PP's. 
Sentences, NP and PP's now have type 
CxDxExE 
CxDxExExA 
CxDxExExA 
respectively. These are to be interpreted as follows: C are the 
connections; D the discourse situations; E the resource coes and the second E 
the coes which forms the subject matter of the main sentence. We require an 
additional NP-rule: 
(i) If a is an NP then (aR) is an NP. 
(ii) c,d(alt)Jelt,e <a> c,d[alelt,elt 
In other words, for a referential reading the NP utilizes the resource coe." 
For the referential resding of PP's we introduce: 
(i) If IT is a PP then (IT It) is a PP. 
(ii) c,di(lTlt»elt,e <a> c,dhJelt,elt• 
All the other NP's, PP's and sentences have this additional component but 
otherwise remsin unchanged (see appendix for details). 
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concerning the subject of resource situations (cou) can be 
Attitude! and Embedded Sentence! In this section we introduce the 
We shall not say anything about the lexical meaning of the 
attitudes but refer the reader to [5] for a detailed discussion. 
we shall concentrate on the problems posed by embedded sentences. This 
based on the account given in [6]. 
the following rule to our syntax 
(i) If e is an Sand & an AV (attitude verb) then (&e) is a PP 
where AV - {said that, believea that, thinks that} 
we provide the semantic rule we need to look carefully at the possible 
of sentences involving embedded sentences. Consider 
Hob said that a witch haa blighted Bob's mare. 
from the possibility of loading the indefinite description .!.Q.U witch 
there,are"no,w ,,£urther ~alternativ:es. "Inutte.ring Jll.t 
speaker is building up a coe with Hob in it. He might mean that the 
iridefinite description is to designate some member of a group of witches. 
This would be true if, for example, Hob had pointed to a group of witchea 
if you insist, women taken by Bob to be witches) and said:. "One of you 
blighted Bob's mare." On the other hand, Hob might have uttered: "A witch 
blighted Bob's mare." We now interpret the indefinite description .I!. 
from the coe of the embedded sentence. On this interpretation !!a. 
~ s..QJ!I.mitted ~!!a. existence of l!i!:.£.l!n. Can we get both these 
interpretations? Iii particular, can we get the first one? Tentatively, we 
put forward the following semantic rule for our new PP's: 
c,d[(ge)]eR,e,a <a> c,d(9JeR,e,a,P 
where P - {e':c,dle1eR,e'} 
Attitudes are thus understood to express a relation between persons and 
propositions. But as it stands this rule will not give us the firat reading. 
'For the first reading of our chosen sentence we want the indefinite 
'de!cription of .I!. ~ to be loaded by the coe of the whole sentence --
namely e. But this is not possible since e is not accessible anymore. To 
get the above reading we need to pass the coe e, along with e' and e R, to the 
embedded sentence e. To facilitate, this Barwise and Perry "stack" the coes 
as they are encountered. Sentence now have semantic type 
CxDxMxE 
121 
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where m € H - E*. These component. are: the connections; discourse 
situation; the resource stack and the coe which forms the subject matter of 
the main sentence. 
We need to replace the PP and NP rules introduced in the last lIection by the 
following two rules: 
(NPF) 
(PPE) 
w 
(H) 
W 
(ii) 
If a ill an NP. then (a i ) (i > 0) is an NP. 
c.d[(ai)lm.e.a <-> c.dlala.m+i.a 
where m+! ill the ith member (from the top) of 
the resource stack III. 
If W ill a pp. then (wi)(i > 0) is a PP. 
c.dl(wi)la.e.a <-> c.dlwlm.mH,a. 
With these rules understood we can state our PP-rule involving the attitudes. 
(PPD) (ii) c,d[(Q')llll,e,a <-> c,d[Qlm,e,a,P where P - {e':c,d[8lm*e,e'} 
where m*e is the stack formed from m by adding e to the top. 
3. HOB, NOB, BOB AND COB 
We now have an the semantic apparatus necell8ary to give our analysill of 
Geach's rebellious sentence. We represent the sentence in SIT by the 
following ezpression: 
[
Hob tbinks that «a witc~)l)(-has blightedv Bob'. mare) 
, - and 
Bob believes tbat zl (- ba. killed w Cob'. "sow) 
The deacription • ~ is to form part of the subject matter of the 
embedded sentence "a witch haa blighted Bob'. mare"; it ill not to be loaded 
by the coe which form. the subject matter of II. The latter would comlllit the 
reporter to the ezilltence of witches and thill ill not implied by Geach'. 
intended reading. 
To investigate the consequences of the above representation we must work out 
the semantics of thill sentence in some detail. By (SB), d,d'leR,e reduces 
t02 
(:!Ic' .2 c)[d,c'1Hob(-thinks that «a vitchu)l)(-has blighted 1 
Bob's mare»JeR,e 
and 
d,c'[Bob(-believe. that zl (-bas killed v Cob's 
Boy»lIeR,e 
1 • 
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BY NPA and PPD this is equivalent to 
(:iIc' .=. c)[:iIal e A(d,c'[Hob]eR,e,al and d,c'[thinks tbatleR,e,al'p 
wbere P • {e':d,c'[«a witc~)l)(-bas blighted v 
Bob's mare)]eR;e,e'}) 
and 
:iIa2 e A(d,c'[NobJeR,e,a2 and d,c'[believes tbat]eR,e,a'2,Q 
wbere Q • {e":d,c'[x:l (-bas killedw Cob's 
sow) )ea..e,e"}) 
]. 
Now we examine P and Q in more detail. By (SA) tbese reduce to: 
P .. {e'::iIa eA sucb tbat d,c'[«a witchu)l)]e~e,e' ,a and 
d,c'[(-has bligbted~ Bob's mare)De~e,e',a} 
Q" {e"::iIbeA sucb tbat d,c'[xlJJe~e,e",b and 
d,c'«-has kil1e~ Cob's sow)]e~e,e",b}. 
By NPC and NPB tbese are equivalent to: 
P .. 
Q .. 
{e'::iIaeA sucb tbat d,c'[(a witc~)]eR*e,e',a 
(and if c'(xl) is defined it equals a) and 
d,c'I(-bas bligbted
v 
Bob's mare)]e~e,e',a} 
{e"::iIbeA sucb that c'(xl) - band 
d,c'[(-bas killed
w 
Cob's sow)]e~e,e",b}. 
Finally, using NPD, PPa, LRP and RP we obtain: 
P .. {e'::iIa eA sucb that e;'(u)(I(witch),a) .. 1 
(and if c'(xl) is defined it equals a) and 
d,c'[(-bas bligbted
v 
Bob's mare)]eRe*,e',a} 
Notice tbat tbe object b is determined by c' and so is fixed for all e" e Q. 
This is intuitively what we wanti Nob's beliefs bave some single focua. 
Moreover, since the constraints on c' demand tbat a • b, it is fixed for all 
e' eP. In other words, Hob and Nob bave attitudes directed towards tbe same 
individual. This is exactly wbat Geacb's intended reading demands. On tbe 
other band, tbe individual does not form part of the subject matter of tbe 
whole sentence -- there is no demand tbat an individual exists as part of tbe 
cae e. Tbis is bow it sbould be: tbe reporter is not to be committed to tbe 
existence of witches or anything else (except Hob, Nob, Bob, Cob, tbe sow and 
the mare). 
We can state our solution more informally as follows: 
123 
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There is an individual a who is part of every course of 
events e which forms part of the subject matter of Hob's 
thoughts and in each such e, a blighted Bob's mare. There 
is an individual b who is part of every course of events e' 
which forms the subject matter of Nob's beliefs and in each 
such e', b killed Cob's sow. Moreover, a-b. 
Individuals and relations enter into or constitute courses of events and such 
courses of events can form part of the beliefs and thoughts of in4ividuals. 
As Barwise and Perry say in [4]: 
"Once we move from an actual situation to its type, we 
realize that the facts might have been otherwise, that 
there are situation-types that don't fit the actual 
situation. Indeed these 'unactual' types are involved in 
our hopes, our fears, our intentions... Most of our mental 
life and hence the language we use to describe that mental 
life, involves situation types." 
Can we obtain other readings of the Geach sentence -- those that Geach did 
not intend? Suppose the reporter is more enlightened and actually believes 
in the existence of witches. Suppose Hob points to a group of women 
(believed by the reporter, Hob and Nob to be witches) and says 
.2!!!l. of l!!!!!. b ligh t ed !QR.J. lYU. 
Nob echoes the sentiment and yells 
The witch would then form part of the subject matter of the whole sentence 
spoken by the reporter. To capture this reading the description A ~ 
would have now to be loaded by the coe of the whole sentence. This reading 
can be obtained from the SIT expression: 
[
Hob said that «(a witchu)l)l)(-has blightedv Bob's mare) 
lji. and 
Nob said that xl (-haa killedw Cob's sow.) 
The only difference concerns the loading index on the description A yitchu ' 
We assign to the reader the task of computing the coe's described by lji. 
Next suppose, Hob and Nob have been talking about witches (with the reporter 
present> and have mentioned several by name: Joyce, Janet, June and Janice. 
The reporter is skeptical about the existence of witches but believes that 
these women are the cause of Hob and Nob's mania. In this case the reading 
we want is given by: 
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n .. [
HOb«(an individual)l)I)(-thinks that xI«-is a witchu) A 
(-blighted
v 
Bob's mare» and 
Nob believes that xl killedw Cob's sow. 
Here we have the "quantifying in" rule because we want the NP m individual 
to be loaded by the resource coe which has Joyce, Janet, June and Janice as 
its constituents. 
4. INTENTIONAL IDENTITY AND POSSIBLE WORLDS 
The most detailed analysis of the Geach sentence to date occurs in the 
writings of Saarinen. It will be instructive to compare the analysis offered 
here with the solution of Saarinen. Saarinen's account utilizes both 
possible-worlds and game-theoretic semantics. We shall not say anything 
about game-theoretic semantics; our main concern is to compare and contrast 
situation and possible world semantics with respect to the problem of 
intentional identity. 
In order to provide an analysis of Geach's sentence Saarinen appeals to a 
distinction (due to Hintikka) between two different ways of· identifying 
individuals across possible worlds. According to Hintikka, we cross-identify 
individuals between possible worlds in two essentially different ways. 
Hintikka has called these two ways of trans-world identification the physical 
and the perspectival methods. The purpose of the descriptive or the physical 
method of individuation is to pin down, from the different possible worlds we 
are considering, the same concrete physical individual. According to the 
perspectival or contextual individuation method, we cross-identify an 
individual by the role that individual plays in the attitudes of the agent. 
These two methods of identification induce two distinct methods of 
quantification. The first is bssed on the physical method, of individuation 
and commits one to the actual existence of individuals. The second has a 
different function: it is a device to state that in all the various possible 
worlds we may have to consider, we are to consider the same individual. 
To complete his analysis Saarinen has to face one further problem. On the 
intended reading of the Geach sentence, the focus of the two attitudes (one 
of Hob's and one of Nob's) must be the same. But how can this be; how could 
two perspectivally cross-identified individuals be one and the same? On the 
face of it, it seems that the perspectival croBs-identification method cannot 
be used to admit comparisons between worlds introduced by the attitudes of 
two different persons. Saarinen "solves" this problem by appeal to the 
authority of Hintikka. Apparently, we can cross-identify two perspectivally 
identified individuals provided that there is some causal relation between 
the two. Hob's thoughts and Nob's beliefs are part of the vocabulary of the 
actual world and therefore, Hob's thoughts and Nob's beliefs may interact 
with the course of the actual world in various ways. This is part of what is 
involved in the stipulation causal connection. 
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With all this accepted and understood, we can state Saarinen's solution: 
There is a perspectivally cross-identified individual a in 
Hob's think-alternatives such that in each of tbose worlds 
she is a witch and she has blighted Bob'. mare. There is a 
perspectivally cross-identified individual b in Nob's 
belief-alternatives such that in each of those worlds she 
is a witch and she killed Cob's sow; Moreover, a bears an 
sppropriate caus'al relation to b. 
This sum mary of Saarinen's solution does not do justice to the subtlety and 
length of Saarinen's expositinn, but we hope that we have said enough for the 
reader to grasp the essence of the possible world approach. 
Saarinen's solution seems to provide the intended reading but it seems 
com mitted to several recalcitrant and controversial notions. As Hintikka and 
Saarinen admit, the two ways of trans-world identification become very 
problematic as soon as one attempts anything like a detailed analysis. 
Moreover, the concept of a "causal connection" between two perspectivally 
identified individuals is far from being a clear one. 
Nevertheless, I believe that there are certain correct intuitions driving the 
Saarinen analysis. Certainly the notion of the role played by sn individual 
in our thoughts and beliefs has something to recommend it. The individual 
(witch) in Geach's sentence is identified, by the reporter at least, 
according to the .I2k it plays in the thoughts and beliefs of Hob and Nob. 
Unfortunately, the framework of possible worlds seems to be a hindrance to 
the task of giving a clear analysis of this notion. On the sccount given by 
situation semantics, the individual in question enters into the course of 
events which constitute the propositions believed by Hob and Nob. In these 
courses of events, the individual has certain properties and stands in 
certain relations to other individuals. These properties and relations sre 
precisely what define the role of the individual in the thoughts and beliefs 
of Hob and Nob. 
FOOTNOTES 
lThis rule apparently causes some problems. Sentences of the form "John 
walks and she talks" get the interpretation: John walks and someone talks. 
One way out is to ban sentence conjunctions from SIT which have pronouns in 
the second conjunct with no antecedent in the first or some prior conjunct --
unless they are a variable of "quantifying in." The other way out is to deny 
that it gives the wrong reading. 
2We have assumed the resource stack has s single member eR. 
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APPENDIX 
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF SIT 
(i) Syntax 
Bas ic .l!m.!!l!. 
(a) n-ary relation symbols r.s •••• 
(b) a gap -
(c) Thing variables X • {Xl' x2 •••• } 
(d) Names N· {nl' n2 •••• } 
(e) Location variables U· {ul' u2 •••• } 
(f) Logical operators A • V 
(g) Singular determiners A. ~ 
(h) Attitude verbs AV - {believes that. thinks that. said that} 
Sentence Rules (S-Rules) 
SA If a is an NP and ~ is a PP then [a~l is an S 
SB If °1 and -2 are in S then [0l A '21 and [0l v -21 are in S. 
NPA If a is a name. a is an NP 
NPB If X is a thing variable. X is an NP 
NPC If a is an NP then (a i ) is an NP; a i is the antecedent of Xi 
NPD If ~ is a determiner and ~ a PP then (~~) is an NP 
NPE I is an NP 
NPF If a is an NP then (ai ) is an NP for i > O. 
Property Phrase 1!,y!u. (PP-Rulea) 
RP-Rule If r is an n-ary basic relation symbol. then r and ~ are 
n-ary relation phrases 
LRP-Rule If y is an RP and u a location variable then Yu is an 
n-ary located relation phrase. 
PPA If Y is an n-ary LRP and tl ••••• tn are thing terms 
with gap t· then tIYt2 ..... tn is a PP (if t· a 
free variagle it is free in the resulting ppt 
PPB If ~l and ~2 are PP's then (~l A ~2) is a PP. 
PPC If (ai? is an NP and ~ is a PP (with Xi free). then 
(ain) is a PP (with Xi bound) 
PPD If 9 €AV and _ is an S. then. (9f) is a PP. 
PPE If ~ is a PP then, (ni) is a PP for i > O. 
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(ii) Semlntic ~ 
(a) a E A 
(b) r € Il - 110 U III U 112 
(c) I € L 
Situation. 
-individual. 
-relation. 
-location. 
(a) • € S - L x T -.ituations 
(b) t" T - ~~ X An .... {O,l} -.ituation types 
(c) a" I - L-.... T -course. of eventl 
(d) III" K - E* -stack. of coe. 
(e) d € D .!:. S -di.couna situation. 
(f) c € C - xU U .... Au L(c(x) € Ai c(u) € L) -coUDectioD8 
8emaptic IlH.l. 
DxCxKxl 
DxCxKxlxA 
DxCxKxExA 
D x C x K x E x P(I) x A 
D x C x K x E x L X An 
D x C x K x I X An 
Ipterpretatiop Fupctiop 
-sentences 
-noun phra.e. 
-property phra.es 
-attitude verbs 
-n-ary relation phra.es 
-n-sry located relation phrase. 
I assign to names element. of A and to n-ary rel.tion .ymhols 
elementl of Ilg. 
(iii) Sl!IlIptic llGI.u. 
NP-Ilulu 
NPA d,c[nlm,e,a <a> I(n) - a 
NPB d,clxlm,e,a <a> c(x) - a 
NFC d,c[(ui)Dm,e,a <a> d,c[d!III,e,a and if c(xi) is defined, c(xi) - a 
NPD d,c[(~n)].,e,a <a> a i. the unique x such that d,c[n]m,e,x 
d,c[(~n)Ia,e,a <a> a is some x such that d,c[n].,e,x 
NFl d,c[r]III,e,a <a> a - a 
NPF d,c[(ul)JIII,e,a <a> d,c [qJ m,m+i,a where mH is the ith member of m. 
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PP-Rules 
RP d,c[dm,e,1,.!!. <a> e1(I(r),.!!.) = 1 
d,c[~r]m,e,1,.!!. <-> e1(I(r),.!!.) - 0 
LRP d,cI[Yu]m,e,.!!. < .. > d,c[y]m,e,c(u) ,.!!. 
PPA d,c[t1 Y t2 ... tn]m,e,a <a> d,chBm,e,1. where aj" a and for i P j, 
d,c[ti lm,e,ai 
PPB d,c[(1T1 A1T2)]m,e,a <a> (:;Ic' 2.. c)(d,c'Il1T1]m,e,a & d,c'[1T2lm,e,a) 
PPC d,C[(Cl:i1T)]m,e,a <a> (:;Ib)(d,c'[:rr]m,e,a & d,c[(a i)]m,e,b where 
c' = c + <xi,b> and 
c + <xi,b> .. c U <xi,b> if the latter defined as a function. 
PPD d,c[(91!)]m,e,a <a> d,c[91m,e,P,a where P .. {e':d,c[ll]m*e,e'} 
and m*e is the stack created from m by adding e to the top. 
PPE d,c[(1Ti )]m,e,a <a> d,cldm,mJ.i,a. 
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